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EXPLAINING MORAL VARIETY*
B y C h a n d r a n  K u k a t h a s
What wide difference, therefore, in the sentiments of morals, must 
be found between civilized nations and Barbarians, or between na­
tions whose characters have little in common? How shall we pretend 
to fix a standard for judgments of this nature?
David Hume, "A Dialogue"1
Reflection on the variety of forms of social life has long been a source 
of moral skepticism. The thought that there are many radically different 
social systems, each of which colors the way its members think about 
moral and political questions, has been thought by many moral philos­
ophers to undermine confidence in our belief that our way of looking at — 
or even posing —these questions is the correct one.2 The fact of cultural 
variety is held to reduce, if not eliminate altogether, the possibility of 
moral criticism of the practices of other societies. This thought is not a re­
cent one; it is implicit, for example, in an observation made in David 
Hume's "A Dialogue," when he writes: _
There are no manners so innocent or reasonable, but may be ren­
dered odious or ridiculous, if measured by a standard, unknown to 
the persons; especially, if you employ a little art or eloquence, in 
aggravating some circumstances, and extenuating others, as best 
suits the purpose of your discourse.3 ,
Moreover, he adds that "[a]ll these artifices may easily be retorted on 
you,"4 suggesting that cross-cultural criticism is a risky enterprise.
* I w ould like to thank  Brian Beddie, William Maley, Ellen Paul, Philip Pettit, and  John 
Tomasi for their detailed and  helpful com m ents on  an earlier draft of this essay.
1 David H um e, "A  D ialogue," in H um e, Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and 
concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. N idditch (Oxford: Claren­
don Press, 1975), p. 333.
2 This thought is raised directly by the philosopher David M cN aughton in his Moral Vi­
sion: An Introduction to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), p . 147. The m ost influential philo­
sophical treatm ent of this topic in recent years is probably John M ackie's Ethics: Inventing 
Right and Wrong (H arm ondsw orth: Penguin, 1978).
3H um e, "A D ialogue," p. 330.
4 Ibid. W hether or no t this reflects a thoroughgoing m oral skepticism  in H um e 's th in k ­
ing is, of course, another question. My ow n inclination is to  accept David N orton 's  account
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So even when not tempted down the path to moral skepticism, philos­
ophers struck by the fact of cultural diversity have been induced to take 
great pains to stress the importance of toleration of cultural differences. 
Thus, Charles Taylor, for example, suggests that we accept a “presump­
tion of equal worth" of cultures as an appropriate opening moral stance.5 
And many others have reflected on the difficulties that must be con­
fronted when practicing cultural toleration means condoning intolerable 
practices.6
Cultural variety may be thought, then, to pose serious problems for 
moral theory, since it has thrown into question the possibility of moral 
criticism, and indeed the possibility of any sort of universal moral ratio­
nality. If moral systems are culturally shaped or determined, it may not 
even be possible to compare moral values. This thought appears to be im­
plicit in the recent development of John Rawls's political philosophy inso­
far as he has abandoned his search for universal moral principles and 
recast his theory of justice as an attempt to articulate the principles of 
political justice appropriate only for modern democratic societies such as 
the United States.7
The purpose of this essay is to argue that cultural diversity is not the 
problem it is often taken to be.8 It does not preclude the possibility of 
moral criticism or of developing universal moral standards. Nor does it 
make it impossible to compare moral values or to acquire moral knowl­
edge. Central to this argument are an account of the meaning of culture 
and an account of the nature of moral variety. The case I wish to put is 
that once the nature of cultural diversity or pluralism is properly under­
stood, it will not appear to be the problem for moral theory it is sometimes 
made out to be. This will become clearer if we can find an explanation for 
moral variety which shows why it arises and indicates why this need not 
issue in moral isolationism. I will suggest that such an account is avail­
able in Adam Smith's moral theory.
of H um e as a common-sense moralist. See Norton, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Scep­
tical Metaphysician (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).
5 Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition," w ith com m entary by 
Am y G utm ann, Steven C. Rockefeller, Michael Walzer, and Susan Wolf (Princeton: Prince­
ton  University Press, 1992), p. 72.
6 O ne of the m ost im portant recent works addressing this problem  is Will Kymlicka's Lib­
eralism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: C larendon Press, 1989).
7 O n the  developm ent of R awls's th ough t and  the  m ove aw ay from  universalism , see 
Richard A rneson, "In troduction  [to a Sym posium  on Rawlsian Theory of Justice: Recent 
D evelopm ents]," Ethics, vol. 99, no. 4 (July 1989), pp . 695-710.
8 Some writers in the so-called "realist school" have also tried to defend this line over the 
last ten  years or so. See, for example, David W iggins, "Truth, Invention, and  the M eaning 
of Life," in Geoffrey Sayre-M cCord, ed ., Essays on Moral Realism (Ithaca and  London: Cor­
nell University Press, 1988), pp. 127-65, w here it is argued that the elem ent of "invention" 
noncognitivists have identified in m orality is som ething w hich can be accom m odated by a 
realist m oral theory.
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The argument is offered here in three sections. In the first, I look at the 
question of the nature of culture as it bears on morality and suggest that 
there is not as much cultural conflict as might appear. Here I draw on the 
writings of T. S. Eliot on culture, and take issue with Alasdair MacIntyre's 
arguments concerning the incommensurability of rival cultural traditions. 
In the second, I turn to the problem of explaining moral variety and try 
to show what Smith has to offer. And in the final section, I attempt to ex­
plain why the nature of culture and the nature of moral variety should 
leave us optimistic about the possibility of cross-cultural moral criticism, 
and of developing some universal moral standards.
I. T h e  N a t u r e  o f  C u l t u r e
In how many circumstances would an Athenian and a French man 
of merit certainly resemble each other? Good sense, knowledge, wit, 
eloquence, humanity, fidelity, truth, justice, courage, temperance, 
constancy, dignity of mind: These you have all omitted; in order to 
insist only on the points, in which they may, by accident, differ.9
Much recent writing in moral and political philosophy has emphasized 
the significance of cultural diversity as a feature of the modern world. We 
might consider three examples. The first is a paper by the British politi­
cal scientist Bhiku Parekh, reflecting upon the Rushdie affair. Soon after 
its publication in 1989, Salman Rushdie's novel The Satanic Verses was con­
demned as a work deeply offensive to Islam. The Ayatollah Khomeini 
issued a death sentence for Rushdie and, in Britain, a ban on the book 
was proposed by certain Muslim groups. Parekh reads the conflict, be­
tween the supporters of Rushdie and the Muslims who criticize and want 
to punish him, as representative of a wider conflict between different 
ways: "Rushdie thus stands at the centre of such large battles as those be­
tween Christianity and Islam, secularism and fundamentalism, Europe 
and its ex-colonies, the host society and its immigrants, the post and pre­
modernists, art and religion, and between scepticism and faith."10 The 
whole affair raises questions about "how to forge common values out of 
a welter of conflicting moral systems, how much diversity a society can 
accommodate without losing its cohesion," and so on.11
The second example comes from the work of the American philosopher 
Iris Marion Young in her book Justice and the Politics of Difference. Out of 
the Enlightenment, Young argues, came a revolutionary conception of
9 H um e, "A D ialogue," pp. 333-34.
10 Bhiku Parekh, "The Rushdie Affair: Research A genda for Political Philosophy," Polit­
ical Studies, vol. 38, no. 4 (December 1990), pp . 695-709, at p . 696.
11 Ibid., pp . 708-9.
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humanity and society which regarded all people as equal. Its ideals of lib­
erty and equality inspired movements against oppression and domina­
tion, and swept away norms defining rights and obligations on the basis 
of group membership (of different races, classes, religions, or sexes). Yet 
while this is all very well, the ideal of "liberation as the elimination of 
group difference" has become questionable: "The very success of politi­
cal movements against differential privilege and political equality has gen­
erated movements of group specificity and cultural pride."12 Young's 
book, indeed, offers a sustained critique of the moral ideal of justice, 
which she sees as resting on an ideal of assimilation.
The third example is the argument of Will Kymlicka that cultural com­
munities, such as those of "indigenous peoples," ought to be accorded 
special protections by the law, so that their culture is not undermined. If 
a "cultural structure" is weakened by external influences, this may be se­
verely damaging to the individuals who live within it, since their capac­
ity to make meaningful choices may be diminished. The task for liberals, 
"in every country," is to find a way "to liberalize a cultural community 
without destroying it."13
These examples illustrate two kinds of concern about cultural diversity 
which are prevalent in contemporary discussions. The first is a concern 
about the existence of fundamental differences — and of moral conflicts — 
of a very deep kind in modern societies. The differences between Islam 
and Christianity provide a prime example of this conflict; the differences 
between the practices of the more remote and isolated or traditional 
Aboriginal societies in Australia and those of the European mainstream 
provide another. The second is a concern about the existence of conflicts 
between the values of different groups within society seeking to differ­
entiate or distinguish themselves from the mainstream. Hispanics and 
ethnic immigrant minorities within the United States are examples of 
such groups, which share with the wider society a certain cultural inher­
itance but which nonetheless want to see themselves as culturally dis­
tinct.
It would be mistaken to think that there are not some real — and diffi­
cult—issues here. Where cultural differences prevail, moral conflicts, it 
seems, tend to arise. Yet it is worth asking at this point what it means to 
say that cultural differences exist, and how far differences do exist. We 
should begin by asking: What is (a) culture?14
Bernard Williams suggests that a culture is a "social world," and in rec­
ognizing that human beings cannot live without a culture, and that there
12 Iris M arion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990), p . 157.
13 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, p. 170. ‘
14 There is, of course, a considerable sociological and  anthropological literature on  cul­
tu re. Som e of this is discussed in M ichael Carrithers, Why Humans Have Cultures: Explain­
ing Anthropology and Social Diversity (Oxford and  N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
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are many cultures, we must see that there are many social worlds in 
which human beings must find their way around.15 Kymlicka, however, 
offers a more substantial account, suggesting that culture should be de­
fined "in terms of the existence of a viable community of individuals with 
a shared heritage (language, history, etc.)"16 Yet we come closer still to 
understanding what a culture is if we recognize T. S. Eliot's contention 
that a culture is a "way of life."17 Eliot's point is that culture is "not 
merely the sum of several activities."18 To be sure, in every culture there 
are distinctive activities: all cultures produce art, display customs and 
habits, and practice some religion. But there is more to culture than that:
[C]ulture is made visible in their [i.e., a people's] arts, in their social 
system, in their habits and customs, in their religion. But these 
things added together do not constitute the culture, though we of­
ten speak for convenience as if they did. These things are simply the 
parts into which a culture can be anatomised, as a human body can. 
But just as a man is something more than an assemblage of the var­
ious constituent parts of his body, so a culture is more than the 
assemblage of its arts, customs, and religious beliefs.19
Yet if it is true that the different parts of a culture cannot exist in iso­
lation, it is no less true that the culture itself cannot do so. Indeed, while 
we may be able to distinguish different cultures in a general way, this 
does not mean that we can point to where one culture begins and another 
ends. We can, as Eliot suggests, speak, for example, of "European cul­
ture," but its boundaries cannot be fixed: "European culture has an area, 
but no definite frontiers: and you cannot build Chinese walls."20 It 
would be a mistake to "consider the culture of Europe simply as the sum 
of a number of unrelated cultures in the same area"; it would be no less 
a mistake to "separate the world into quite unrelated cultural groups."21 
There is no absolute line that can be drawn between East and West, be­
tween Europe and Asia.
This is not to deny the existence of cultural variety, or indeed the depth 
of the differences between some ways of life. Muslim communities in ur­
ban Malaysia are very different from communities in rural Bowling 
Green, Ohio. But it would be a mistake to think they have nothing in 
common. This is not because they might share superficial things in com­
15 Bernard W illiams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana/Collins, 1985), 
p. 150.
16 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, p. 168.
17 T. S. Eliot, Notes towards the Definition of Culture (London: Faber, 1948), p. 41.
18 Ibid.
19Ibid., p. 120. -
20 Ibid., p. 62.
21 Ibid., p . 121.
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mon (like access to U.S. television sitcoms). It is rather that, at a deeper 
level, they would share some common influences. For example, insofar 
as Christianity and Islam share a certain heritage, these two communities 
would have in common religious conceptions whose similarities neither 
may be aware of. This is not to suggest that the two cultures are closely 
related, though they have in common with each other more than either 
shares with, say, the culture of the aboriginal people of New Zealand, the 
Maori. The crucial point, however, is that they are not entirely unrelated. 
And, arguably, many cultures have come to have more in common as 
they have come into contact with one another. For example, Maori cul­
ture is held to be very strongly nonindividualist, with groups and their 
welfare regarded as the prime values and individuals finding their iden­
tity in the group whose ends they exist to serve. Yet the advent of Euro­
pean settlers, by making the option of leaving the group real, brought 
about a significant move away from the collective orientation of the 
Maori—even before the influences of European religion and custom were 
felt.22
A certain unity of culture is always to be found among people who 
live together and speak the same language, "because speaking the same 
language means thinking, and feeling, and having emotions rather dif­
ferently from people who use a different language."23 Yet, as Eliot sug­
gests, "the cultures of different peoples do affect each other"; and "in the 
world of the future it looks as if every part of the world would affect ev­
ery other part."24 The fact that we can distinguish separate cultures does 
not mean that we can isolate them. The idea of an uncontaminated culture 
existing in a single village or a self-contained national culture is absurd inso­
far as it implies that a culture can exist other than in relation to others.25
Cultures must be seen, then, as distinguishable ways of life which are 
the product of the interaction of individuals within cultures and among 
cultures. Because they are the product of interaction, and are subject to 
numerous influences, cultures are also mutable. And changes over the 
years may be profound: the members of a cultural community may grow 
to have more in common with the culture of their neighbors than with 
that of distant ancestors. A "fully individuable culture," as Williams puts 
it, is at best a rare thing: "cultures, subcultures, fragments of cultures, 
constantly meet one another and exchange and modify practices and atti­
tudes."26
22 See Richard M ulgan, Maori, Pakeha, and Democracy (Auckland: Oxford University 
Press, 1989), p. 64.
23 Eliot, Notes towards the Definition of Culture, pp. 120-21.
24Ibid., p. 121.
25 For an  an thropologist's view rejecting the  possibility of cultural isolation, see Car- 
rithers, Why Humans Have Cultures, esp. ch. 2 and pp . 24 and  118.
26 W illiams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 158.
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These points about the nature of culture are worth making because it 
has been argued that there are severe problems of communication across 
cultures. There are problems of translatability of concepts or notions, as 
well as problems of commensurability of standards or values. These prob­
lems, in turn, create serious obstacles to the development of any kind 
of universal rational moral discourse. This argument has been put most 
vigorously by Alasdair MacIntyre, and it is worth examining because it 
plays an important role in his critique of modernity and of modern moral 
theory.
The view MacIntyre wishes to reject, in the first instance, is the view 
most commonly associated with Donald Davidson, who asserts that there 
are no insuperable problems of interpretation and translation between 
languages or "conceptual schemes." Conceptual schemes cannot turn 
out to be wholly or radically incommensurable. Davidson's argument is 
an important one, not least because moral philosophers like David 
McNaughton have appealed to it to try to show that the commensurabil­
ity of all conceptual schemes implies that different moral schemes cannot 
be incommensurable.27 MacIntyre, however, is unimpressed by David­
son's argument, largely because it only denies the possibility of "radical" 
incommensurability. MacIntyre is quite prepared to concede this point on 
the grounds that anyone would accept that "there will always be some­
thing in common between any two languages or any two sets of 
thoughts."28 But any stronger claim is less tenable.
For MacIntyre, the intimate connection between language and commu­
nal belief creates serious obstacles to translation. This is because cultures 
can be very different —so much so that they cannot be adequately char­
acterized, let alone understood, without actually living in them for a 
length of time.29 To understand their languages requires total immer­
sion. But to go further, to translate a language's statements into another 
language, is to bring down further problems. Implicit in the terms of ref­
erence and classification of a linguistic community are substantive crite­
ria of evaluation or standards of truth and rationality. To translate into the 
language of a very different tradition of beliefs poses enormous difficul­
ties because the substantive import of a name or a term of classification 
may be lost in the move from one tradition-laden language to another. A 
different, but no less disturbing, difficulty emerges, MacIntyre argues, in 
attempts to translate from a "language-in-use" (or the language of a par­
ticular moral community) into one of the "international languages of 
modernity" (such as that of contemporary Western intellectual discourse).
27 M cN aughton, Moral Vision, pp . 152-54.
28 Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1988), p. 371.
29 Ibid., p. 374.
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Because the languages of late-twentieth-century modernity make only 
"minimal presuppositions in respect of possibly rival belief systems," and 
truth is "assimilated, so far as possible, to warranted assertibility, and rea­
sonableness, so far as possible, is relativized to social content," when 
texts are translated from traditions with substantive criteria of truth and 
rationality, they are presented in a way which neutralizes the conceptions 
of truth and rationality and the historical context.30 Translation in this 
case would produce a text which would not be recognized by the audi­
ence for whom the original was intended.
This argument is the basis of MacIntyre's contention that rival tradi­
tions and cultures are much less accessible to our understanding than we 
think. The "belief in its ability to understand everything from human cul­
ture and history, no matter how alien," he argues, "is itself one of the 
defining beliefs of the culture of modernity." 31 But the translations gen­
erated by modern discourse have, in his view, generally presented mis­
understandings of tradition. The fact modern discourse has not been able 
to grasp is that "there may be traditional modes of social, cultural and 
intellectual life which are as such inaccessible to it and to its trans­
lators."32
MacIntyre's argument is important because he uses his claims about the 
problems of understanding between rival traditions or cultures to support 
his contention that rival moral traditions are also essentially incompara­
ble. It is simply not true, according to MacIntyre, that there are stan­
dards of rationality adequate for the evaluation of rival answers to moral 
questions:
■- [W]hat those problems are, how they are to be formulated and ad­
dressed, and how, if at all, they may be resolved will vary not only 
with the historical, social, and cultural situation of the persons whose 
problems these are but also with the history of belief and attitude of 
each particular person up to the point at which he or she finds these 
problems inescapable.33
The answer will depend on who you are and how you understand your­
self. But there are no "tradition-independent standards of argument" to 
which an appeal might be made.34
The basis of this contention may, however, turn out to be very weak 
if we examine MacIntyre's arguments about culture and comparability 
more closely, particularly in the light of Eliot's understanding of the na­
30 Ibid., p. 384.
31 Ibid., p. 385.
32Ibid., p. 387.
33Ibid., p . 393.
34Ibid., p . 403.
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ture of culture. If we begin with the criticism of Davidson, we can see that 
MacIntyre has a point: the fact that "radical" incommensurability between 
cultures or conceptual schemes may be ruled out does not pose any seri­
ous problem to someone who concedes minimal or trivial comparability. 
The question MacIntyre has asked is, How comparable are rival cultural 
traditions? — and his answer is, Not very. Yet we can question whether 
or not he is right on this point, if we consider the extent to which cultures 
are interrelated. Many rival cultural traditions, while superficially differ­
ent, share common ancestries or origins. If we look to the rival cultures 
of Europe, for example, the Christian heritage provides a considerable 
source of cultural unity. It is not merely a matter of shared religious faith; 
as Eliot put it, through Christianity .
we trace the evolution of our arts, through it we have our conception 
of Roman Law which has done so much to shape the Western World, 
through it we have our conceptions of private and public morality. 
And through it we have our common standards of literature, in the 
literatures of Greece and Rome. The Western world has its unity in 
this heritage, in Christianity and in the ancient civilisations of 
Greece, Rome and Israel, from which, owing to two thousand years 
of Christianity, we trace our descent.35
To the extent that Christianity has spread beyond Europe, we can say 
that this inheritance has been embraced by a diversity of peoples, from 
black South Africa to the Philippines, who now hold in common some 
very fundamental ideas and beliefs. A similar point could be made about 
the impact of Islam, which finds adherents in regions as diverse as Egypt, 
Bosnia, and Indonesia.
Even when cultural traditions have their roots in rival religious concep­
tions, the extent of incomparability of their different ideas is reduced by 
the extent to which there has been a history of interaction of religious tra­
ditions. Again, the cases of Islam and Christianity come to mind, since 
these rival traditions at once define themselves in opposition to one 
another and yet share a common philosophical inheritance. If one looks 
at the matter through the history of Islam, for example, it becomes clear 
that Muslim contact through conquest and expansion with diverse cul­
tures resulted in Muslim appropriation and development of different 
intellectual heritages. The integration of the philosophical legacies of 
Greece, India, and Iran contributed to the cosmopolitan character of Is­
lamic civilization. And, as Azim Nanji explains, Christian and Jewish 
scholars, familiar with these legacies, "played a crucial mediating role as 
'translators', particularly since they were also aware that the moral dis­
position of Muslims, like theirs, was shaped by common monotheistic
35 Eliot, Notes towards the Definition of Culture, pp . 122-23.
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conceptions based on divine command and revelation."36 Indeed, when 
comparing cultural traditions, one is struck as much by the similarities as 
by the differences.
Now MacIntyre might well agree with much of this, conceding that 
there are large areas of common ground between many rival cultures or 
traditions. Nonetheless, he could maintain, there does come a point 
when the different cultures become inaccessible to one another because 
the substantive criteria of rationality underpinning the different systems 
make translation impossible. Translating Horace's Odes from Latin into 
the Hebrew of the first-century B.C. Jewish community in Palestine poses 
insuperable problems because of differing conceptions of god and of idol­
atry.37 Yet even if this is so, its significance is doubtful. The most it estab­
lishes is that in some instances there are insurmountable difficulties of 
translation or understanding across cultures. It does not show that there 
is a general problem of cross-cultural comparability. While Davidson may 
have established very little in showing that there is no "radical" incom­
mensurability between conceptual schemes, MacIntyre has established 
equally little by showing that there is some incomparability.
Several other considerations suggest that the extent of incommensura­
bility between cultural traditions is not as great as is sometimes sug­
gested. Conflict between traditions or cultures may, for example, be 
reflective not of fundamental disagreement or differences of value but of 
inadequate understanding of the traditions by rivals, and by practitioners 
themselves. For example, Muslims may insist on the subordinate position 
of women as a fundamental tenet of Islamic practice. Yet the Quran's 
strictures on the family display a concern to ameliorate the status of 
women by abolishing pre-Islamic practices such as female infanticide, and 
according women rights of divorce, property ownership, and inheritance. 
Arguably, many practices which weakened women's status were the re­
sult of local customs which were often antithetical to the spirit of eman­
cipation envisaged in the Quran.38 Conflict between differing cultural 
standards on such issues might be best explained, then, not by appeal­
ing to incommensurability of values or fundamental cultural incompara­
bilities, but by pointing to the fact that not only outsiders but also insiders 
often misunderstand the traditions. Cultural traditions may also be weak­
ened from within not only by the swamping of deeper religious and phil­
osophical traditions by local customs, but also by the overcoming of
36Azim  Nanji, "Islamic E thics," in Peter Singer, ed ., A  Companion to Ethics (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1991), pp . 106-18, at p . 110.
37M acIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, p . 380.
38 See N anji, "Islamic E thics," p . 109. See also, for exam ple, the essays of the  M uslim  
w riter C handra  M uzaffar, "Fem ale Attire: M orality and R eform ," and  "W om en, Religion, 
and  H um anity ,"  in his Challenges and Choices in Malaysian Politics and Society (Penang: Ali- 
ran , 1989), pp . 392-412.
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traditional commitments by powerful interests —which may have the 
power to distort moral discourse. These factors may lead different cultural 
communities down separate paths, despite their shared cultural inheri­
tance.
What this suggests is that there may be many cultures which exhibit 
superficial differences even though they share more fundamental commit­
ments. This may be true of many of the groups Iris Young has in mind — 
groups which wish to differentiate themselves from one another and to 
celebrate their differences. To some extent, it may even be true of the 
communities Bhiku Parekh depicts as representative of wider conflicts be­
tween different ways. Yet, while it is conflict between them that tends to 
bring our minds into focus, it is of their shared presuppositions, which 
make coexistence generally possible, that we need to be reminded.
There is certainly plenty of cultural variety in the world; but, on an ade­
quate understanding of the nature of culture, there is not as much deep 
variety —or difference — as is often asserted. And this suggests that the 
prospect of establishing cross-cultural moral standards may not be as re­
mote as many suppose.
There is, however, an objection that needs to be considered.39 Even if 
there is a deep level at which different cultural understandings con­
verge—since different cultures have more in common than is often sup­
posed-divergent substantive moral beliefs may still be defended or 
justified by appeal to divergent cultural understandings which are less 
fundamental. Even if a Muslim and a Christian come to see that they 
share the same cultural base on some deep level (e.g., a commitment to 
monotheism), they may retain their cultural disagreements that lie one 
level up (e.g., regarding the place of women in society). Those (less fun­
damental) cultural differences can thus serve as a justification for diver­
gent substantive positions still one more level up (e.g., on whether 
women have certain rights). Deep convergence, it might therefore be ar­
gued, does not help us to understand substantive disagreements, since 
the divergence at the intermediate level has not been shown to be affected 
(much less dissolved) by the recognition of convergence at the deepest 
level.
This objection is well-taken insofar as it observes, correctly in my view, 
that moral conflict often takes place not at the level of deepest philosoph­
ical assumptions but rather at the intermediate level. However, there is 
no suggestion here that shared deep beliefs in themselves will ensure 
agreement on intermediate moral principles or on moral practice. The 
argument being advanced here is that the existence of shared fundamen­
tal ideas enhances the possibility of reaching moral agreement and estab­
lishing moral standards. In part, at least, this is because the existence of
39 This was pu t to m e by John Tomasi.
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some shared premises makes moral dialogue possible. And this, I wish 
to suggest, will improve—though not guarantee — the prospects of estab­
lishing cross-cultural moral standards.
 ^ II. M o r a l  Va r ie t y  a n d  M o r a l  T h e o r y
Yet the question will be asked: How, then, are we to account for the 
considerable moral diversity and moral conflict we observe? If cultural dif­
ferences are not always as deep as is commonly supposed, why is there 
so much moral variety? After all, it cannot be denied that there are many 
competing and conflicting moral systems in operation, and that no uni­
versal moral standards have been settled upon. The most obvious expla­
nation for moral variety seems to be that morality is a cultural product 
and cultural variety produces moral variety.
To show, then, that there is some prospect of discovering cross-cultural 
moral standards, it is not enough to argue that cultural differences are not 
always as deep as suggested. The existence of moral variety simply poses 
a challenge to that argument. What is needed is an account of morality 
which offers a plausible explanation of moral diversity as well as an expla­
nation of how universal standards may be attainable. Such an account is, 
I think, available in the moral theory developed by Adam Smith in his 
Theory of Moral Sentiments. What follows in this section is an account of 
Smith's theory, and an explanation of its importance.
It was not Smith's intention to produce an explanation of moral vari­
ety; his concern rather was to produce a more general account of the na­
ture of morality as something which arose out of the nature of human 
beings. Yet the account which emerges is capable not only of accounting 
for moral variety but also of suggesting what are the prospects of more 
general moral principles gaining currency.
Smith's explanation of the emergence of morality begins with an ac­
count of the capacity for sympathy with their fellows as the most impor­
tant characteristic of human beings. We have a natural tendency to place 
ourselves in the situations of others, to take an interest in their interests, 
to desire that they take an interest in ours. When the mob gaze at the 
dancer on the slack rope, they "naturally writhe and twist and balance 
their own bodies as they see him do";40 we cannot help but react to the 
sorrow of others; we sympathize even with the dead.41 Yet there is an 
even stronger inclination in our nature: the desire to be in accord with our 
fellows.
The great pleasure of conversation and society . . . arises from a cer­
tain correspondence of sentiments and opinions, from a certain har­
40 Adam  Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1976), p. 48.
41 Ibid., p . 52.
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mony of minds, which, like so many musical instruments, coincide 
and keep time with one another. But this most delightful harmony 
cannot be obtained unless there is a free communication of senti­
ments and opinions. We all desire, upon this account, to feel how 
each other is affected, to penetrate into each other's bosoms, and to 
observe the sentiments and affections which really subsist there.42
On the one hand, the "desire of being believed, the desire of persuading, 
of leading, and directing other people" Smith sees as "one of the stron­
gest of all our natural desires" (and perhaps the one upon which is 
founded the characteristic human faculty of speech).43 On the other 
hand, there is an equally strong desire not to be out of step, which in­
clines men to be led by others. For Smith, as Knud Haakonssen suggests, 
"it is basically this continuous exchange that underlies all human 
culture."44
The capacity for sympathy is the basis of all expressions of approval 
and disapproval, which, in Smith's account, is where moral judgment be­
gins. Like Hume before him, Smith sees approval and disapproval as 
essentially emotions or passions. Our natural inclination is to express ap­
proval or disapproval as sympathy dictates; and of course, to seek ap­
proval. The important point here, however, is that the mutuality of 
human sympathy does not only lead men to observe others and to ex­
press approval or disapproval; it also leads them to an awareness that 
they too are being observed and judged. This in turn inclines each indi­
vidual to try to see himself as others would see him by taking up the posi­
tion of an imaginary spectator. In this process he further distances himself 
from his own original motives and sentiments in an effort to see and 
judge them from the standpoint of this spectator, who looks impartially 
at his behavior and that of others and expresses approval or disapproval 
accordingly. In such a process we come to judge our own behavior by the 
standards with which we judge that of others.
Others, then, are crucial for the development of standards of moral self­
evaluation. But more than this, it is the process of self-evaluation by 
reflecting on the likely judgments of others that leads to the development 
of common moral standards. Once again, mutual sympathy and the 
desire to be in harmony with the sensibilities of others are crucially impor­
tant. The individual agent longs for "the entire concord of the affections 
of the spectators with his own" feelings. But to achieve this he must also 
consider what would be felt reasonable by those others, and adjust his 
emotions accordingly, "lowering his passion to that pitch in which the 
spectators are capable of going along with him," and flattening "the
42Ibid., p. 531.
43Ibid., p . 530.
44 K nud H aakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume 
and Adam Smith (Cambridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1981), p. 49.
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sharpness of its natural tone, in order to reduce it to harmony and con­
cord with the emotions of those who are about him ."45
What Smith offers here is an account of how common social standards 
can emerge without anyone's intending it. But it is not only social stan­
dards but also independent moral standards which come out of this pro­
cess. Men in society learn to judge themselves by the same standard by 
which they judge others: a standard of propriety. Yet having asked 
whether others would regard their behavior as proper, they are led to 
wonder whether their behavior is in fact proper. They begin to ask not 
simply how their conduct would be regarded by other spectators but how 
it would be regarded by a third person: an impartial spectator. In the end, 
individuals want not merely the approval of others; they want to be wor­
thy of approval. Nature has endowed them "not only with a desire of be­
ing approved of, but with a desire of being what ought to be approved 
of; of being what [they approve] of in other men." 46
The striking thing about Smith's account of the emergence of moral 
standards in this way is that it relies solely on individual sympathy and 
capacity for expressing approval and disapproval. Utility and interest do 
not come into it. It is the search for approval coupled with a desire to be 
worthy of approval that creates intersubjective standards which exercise 
an independent hold on society's members. As Haakonssen puts it, the 
"general rules of morality are thus the unintended outcome of a multitude 
of individual instances of natural moral evaluation, but once they are in 
existence they are quite capable of directing our moral evaluations."47
Yet this account also suggests why we might find such moral variety 
as we do across different societies. Moral standards, like social standards 
generally, arise out of the interaction of individuals in particular circum­
stances or contexts. But as circumstances differ, so will the objects of ap­
proval and disapproval; thus, the standards of propriety which emerge 
in various contexts will differ. More importantly, they will differ because 
it is the sense of propriety rather than anything else (such as perceptions 
of utility) which inclines individuals to feel approval or disapproval. And 
the sense of propriety is, to some extent, highly subjective, since it is 
likely to be affected by perceptions of the beauty or deformity of an act 
or a character. (There is a tendency to find beauty in things which are 
useful and not hurtful, but Smith takes the view that in making assess­
ments of propriety, usefulness tends to be an afterthought: it is the 
beauty or deformity of a form of behavior which first animates us.)48 So 
the standards of propriety which emerge in various societies might vary
45 Sm ith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, p . 67.
46 Ibid., p. 212.
47 H aakonssen, Science of a Legislator, p . 61.
48 Sm ith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, p . 310.
EXPLAINING MORAL VARIETY 15
considerably, since they have their origins in the mutual sympathy of par­
ticular groups of people, with their own subjective perceptions of beauty 
and deformity. Since social standards are an unintended outcome of 
numerous individual acts of evaluation, it is not surprising that small dif­
ferences in individual judgment can lead to significant differences be­
tween contrasting social systems. It must be remembered, however, that 
although Smith gives great weight to the subjectivity of evaluation at the 
initial stage, he is no simple emotivist. Moral standards emerge out of the 
process of interaction and mutual adjustment among individuals who 
have a strong capacity for sympathy with the joys and sorrows of others, 
but have an equally strong desire that those judged be genuinely worthy 
of approval or disapproval. Morality may have its origins in emotion; but 
it quickly acquires an independent standing which exercises a strong hold 
on individuals.
This last point is important because it indicates that, in Smith's theory, 
moral standards emerge which are more than mere reflections of popu­
lar opinion. Once standards are apparent, individuals do not merely ac­
cept them as givens, but rather embrace the idea of moral conduct, and 
become ready to criticize extant standards on the basis of their own inter­
pretations of what morality demands. At the same time, however, this 
tendency is tempered by the desire not to be out of step with the commu­
nity. In this process, in which individuals lead and look to be led, more 
refined standards of moral conduct are developed.
Different social standards will develop insofar as different judgments 
of propriety will be made in different contexts. But the moral standards 
that emerge will be more than mere conventions, insofar as the desire to 
be moral rather than merely conformist will subject social standards to 
disinterested evaluation and criticism. This is why Smith suggests that, 
although custom will always have a strong influence on a society's moral 
sentiments, it will not be wholly responsible for its moral development. 
While men are swayed by fashion and ideas about what is socially cus­
tomary, this does not distract them entirely from the general search for 
"the natural propriety of action."49
What Smith offers, in one sense, is a descriptive science of morals, 
which explains the relation between human behavior and social (and 
moral) rules. Certain behaviors are repeatedly selected through sympa­
thy as proper, others as improper. "By and by this recurrent pattern will 
stand out clearly and men . . . [will] read it off as rules or guidelines for 
their behaviour.''50 Yet at the same time, while he is offering an account 
of morality as something which is developed in social contexts, there is 
no suggestion in Smith that morality is merely a form of human behavior
49 H aakonssen, Science of a Legislator, p . 60.
50Ibid., p . 61.
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"invented" by human beings. On the contrary, it is in their nature to seek 
to be moral; and it is within their capacity, aided by reflective interaction 
with others, to become moral.51
The importance of Smith's moral theory for our concerns is that it offers 
an explanation of moral variety without denying the possibility of there 
being universal moral standards. The crucial dimension of his theory in 
this respect is the suggestion that morality is discovered in a process of con­
vergence upon moral standards. Within a particular social context, patterns 
of behavior are settled upon, but one of the motivating forces in opera­
tion is the search for standards of propriety. In this process modes of con­
duct may be settled upon as morally acceptable in that context; at the 
same time, whether or not they are morally worthy is kept open, since 
further reflection and criticism may in fact lead us to different conclu­
sions. What is also kept open is the source of further reflective insight and 
criticism: it need not come from within the same society or cultural tra­
dition.
Smith's account of morality as something which is discovered in a pro­
cess of convergence in the course of the interaction of moral evaluations 
suggests, in fact, that further moral development might be possible 
through the greater interaction of moral agents from different moral sys­
tems. Morality, in Smith's theory, is not simply a cultural product; moral­
ity emerges in societies, and moral standards are to some extent shaped 
by cultural norms. But morality develops, as we reflect upon the moral 
standards which have come to be expected and criticize them; as we re­
flect upon our criticisms and ask whether they demand too much of our 
fellows; and as we listen and react to the criticisms of others. And the fact 
that it develops in this way suggests that it can change when the moral 
ideas of different cultures come into contact. Typically, cultural differ­
ences are seen as the source of moral conflict; on Smith's theory, the 
interaction of different cultures might turn out to be a source of moral in­
sight.
This, however, raises the question of how cultural interaction might 
produce moral development, particularly since there may be cause for 
skepticism about the claim that cross-cultural moral disagreement can 
prove beneficial. One important objection runs as follows. Smith's argu-
51 It is tem pting to suggest th a t Sm ith m ight be categorized as a m oral realist. My only 
reservation  about doing so is th e  controversy w hich su rro u n d s the  term , bu t I am  inclined 
to go along w ith  Thom as Nagel, w ho  writes:
Norm ative realism is the view that propositions about w hat gives u s reasons for action 
can be true  or false independently  of how  th ings appear to us, and  that we can hope 
to discover the tru th  by transcending the appearances and  subjecting them  to critical 
assessm ent. W hat w e aim to discover by this m ethod is no t a new  aspect of the exter­
nal w orld, called value, bu t rather just the tru th  about w hat we and others should do 
an d  w ant.
See Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford U niversity Press, 1986), p. 139.
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ment suggests that we care about how others judge us and that this 
guides our moral reflection through the impartial spectator; and this is 
fine insofar as it tells us that the moral standards we establish reflect (indi­
rectly) the judgments of our peers. But why think that the judgments of 
outsiders would have the same effect, or contribute to our moral reflec­
tion? Perhaps the mechanism in question only works locally.52 This 
objection might be extended further: it seems clear that the shape and 
direction of sympathy in individuals is determined by their family, group, 
class, church, sect, and so on. Indeed, as Smith himself recognized, so­
cial pluralism necessarily entails a certain amount of competition and 
antagonism. To the extent that this is true, it would follow that the sym­
pathies engendered within an individual toward certain of his fellows 
would entail antipathies or aversions toward certain others. My case 
seems to assume that pluralism entails merely moral differences when, 
in fact, pluralism also entails competition and antagonism.53
To some extent the objections are well-founded: there has been—and 
will continue to be —a certain tendency for people to reject the judgments 
of outsiders as irrelevant to moral discussion. On the other hand, this 
should not be exaggerated. For one thing, it is clear that, despite our ten­
dency to favor those who are closer to us — members of our own family, 
or church, or local community—we have, nonetheless, acquired moral 
sentiments and developed moral standards which range more widely. We 
have developed the capacity to recognize injustice even when it is perpe­
trated by "one of our own" to the disadvantage of "strangers" from other 
families, or towns, or states, or sects. And while there is a tendency to 
dismiss outside moral traditions, there is also sometimes a tendency to 
romanticize them.54
There is, however, a more important argument to be made for think­
ing that Smith's mechanism is not one which works only locally. The 
crucial point here is Smith's observation that people are not entirely dis­
tracted by fashion and custom from the general search for "the natural 
propriety of action." This is because, in the course of moral development, 
they embrace not merely particular moral standards but, more impor­
tantly, the idea of moral conduct. People become, to at least some degree, 
interested not only in whether conduct conforms to existing moral stan­
dards but also in whether those standards meet the demands of moral­
ity. Morality comes to have a life of its own. But this enhances the
52 This objection was pu t to  m e by John Tomasi.
53 This objection w as pu t to me by Brian Beddie.
54 See, for exam ple, the  television series Millenium, hosted  and narra ted  by H arvard 
anthropologist David M aybury-Lewis, w hich contrasts tribal societies — w ith their harm o­
nious relations and profound w isdom  about people and their place in the w orld—with m od­
ern societies, which are characterized by loneliness, greed, and environm ental pillage. Less 
savory aspects of tribal societies are ignored; on th is point, see Ron B runton, "M illenium : 
G etting Tribal Rites W rong," IPA Review, vol. 45, no. 4 (1992), pp . 51-52.
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possibility of moral interaction and moral criticism. Once morality is 
less —or no longer—tied to custom, it is open to others, including outsid­
ers, to appeal to it. For example, many Muslims in England who called 
for Salmon Rushdie's book to be banned appealed not to Islamic strictures 
but to the English blasphemy laws which favored Christian sensibilities. 
Muslims argued that consistency required the extension of the laws to 
other religions as well. This raised the possibility of moral standards be­
ing revised in either of two ways: first, by extension of the blasphemy 
laws, or, second, by their abandonment.
The point here is not to argue that moral standards are always revised 
peacefully and rationally, or that partiality and conflict have disappeared. 
It is simply to suggest that even when there is antagonism and compe­
tition, moral criticism and moral development are possible.
III. C u l t u r a l  P l u r a l i s m  a n d  M o r a l  K n o w l e d g e
Cultural pluralism is often taken to preclude the possibility of establish­
ing cross-cultural or universal moral standards, or indeed of acquiring 
moral knowledge. In looking to reject this claim, I have tried, first, to 
show why cultural differences do not pose a problem: the reason is that 
there is already a good deal of convergence among cultural traditions. 
Although there are many differences of custom and moral practice, there 
is also a good deal that is shared which makes for the possibility of cross- 
cultural dialogue. Secondly, I have tried to show that there is a moral the­
ory which can account for the existence of moral variety, and also to show 
how moral convergence might be possible. This is the moral theory devel­
oped by Adam Smith. My concern now is to try to draw out the conclu­
sions of the essay, and to offer some final observations about the obstacles 
to, as well as the possibility of, moral knowledge.
The development of universal moral standards is not improbable, be­
cause convergence upon such standards can be regarded as a serious 
possibility. Cultural pluralism can be regarded as an obstacle to such a 
development only if there is no possibility of communicating across cul­
tures and there exist no mechanisms through which moral differences 
might be mediated. But it is not true that communication is impossible; 
and differences are mediated —through dialogue, through informal asso­
ciations, and sometimes through courts of law. So if there are any serious 
obstacles to the establishment of universal standards, cultural pluralism 
is not among them. The fact that cultural traditions in fact have much in 
common supports this contention.
There is an objection which can be raised at this point, however, which 
needs to be considered. It comes from MacIntyre, who denies the signif­
icance of the fact that competing traditions share much in common:
It is not then that competing traditions do not share some standards.
All the traditions with which we have been concerned agree in
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according a certain authority to logic both in their theory and in their 
practice. Were it not so, their adherents would be unable to disagree 
in the way in which they do. But that upon which they agree is 
insufficient to resolve those disagreements. It may therefore seem to 
be the case that we are confronted with the rival and competing 
claims of a number of traditions to our allegiance in respect of our 
understanding of practical rationality and justice, among which we 
can have no good reason to decide in favor of any one rather than of 
the others.55 » * - -- • ...
Here a couple of points need to be made. First, it may in fact be impos­
sible to resolve disagreements between competing traditions by putting 
them up against one another. But if so, it may be because to approach 
matters in this way is simply asking too much. It is much more likely that 
disagreements will be resolved by traditions becoming modified in the 
course of communication between them. This seems much more like the 
way in which moral disputes generally are resolved; very seldom does 
one party accept the other's alleged “knock-down" argument: but on 
occasion moral debate sees one party reassessing his beliefs over time to 
accommodate, and perhaps concede to, moral criticism.
The second point is that MacIntyre may be adopting the assumption 
that the resolution of moral disagreements has to take place at the level 
of philosophical discourse. Yet once again this seems to be asking too 
much. For example, he writes: « ; ■ » •
Consider what is involved in the attempt to evaluate rival claims 
about practical reasoning by comparing each with what are taken to 
be the basic facts about practical reasoning. Hume, for example, 
claims that reason can be nothing but the servant of the passions. 
Aristotle and Aquinas claim that reason can direct the passions. 
Should we then proceed by considering as wide a range as we can 
of examples of human action, in which both reasoning and passion 
are present and play some part in generating action, and in the light 
of those examples decide between the two rival claims? The problem 
is: how to describe the relevant examples.56
But while there may be such difficulties if abstract assumptions confront 
each other, it is not clear that two individuals from different traditions 
attempting to resolve a moral disagreement must turn away because they 
have different basic beliefs. History is full of examples of different ways 
of life coexisting; and many traditions, such as the Islamic, have devel­
oped conventions for the fair treatment of "nonbelievers." The fact of suc­
cessful interaction between different traditions, and the fact that traditions
55 M acIntyre, Whose justice? Which Rationality?, p. 351. ‘ ‘
56 Ibid., p. 332.
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have been modified by others, suggests that conflicts of basic assump­
tions identified by philosophers should not be seen as insurmountable 
obstacles to communication between cultures. It may well be that, in this 
matter, theory lags behind practice. This point is well made in a slightly 
different context by Michael Smith in confronting arguments about moral 
relativism. It is often argued, he notes, that if there is a fundamental rel­
ativity in our reasons then it follows that any convergence we find in our 
moral beliefs must be entirely contingent. Yet why not look at it the other 
way around? “Why not think, instead, that if such a convergence 
emerged in moral practice then that would itself suggest that these par­
ticular moral beliefs, and the corresponding desires, do enjoy a privileged 
rational status?" 57 ! *q;
To the extent that theory is capable of describing how conflicts between 
traditions can be resolved in practice, I suggest that Adam Smith's the­
ory provides us with the appropriate model. If Smith's account is right, 
then it is possible that universal moral norms can emerge out of the sym­
pathetic interaction of moral agents, who act guided by a mixture of con­
cern to be in accord with their fellows and desire to be moral and to be 
morally worthy. To the extent that this is the way in which morality 
develops, there is reason to think that there is also a possibility of moral 
convergence as different cultural traditions interact.
If one were to take the most optimistic view possible, one might even 
consider whether cultural pluralism, far from being an obstacle to the 
achievement of moral knowledge, might not turn out to enhance its pros­
pects. If moral knowledge is acquired in a process of testing our moral 
evaluations in practice, and eliminating practices and standards as our 
sense of propriety is refined through moral criticism, then interaction 
among a large number of cultural traditions opens up the possibility of 
examining and comparing a wider range of moral hypotheses. If there is 
to be a convergence upon universal moral standards, the prospect of our 
finding such standards may be enhanced by a greater range of traditions 
to consider and to draw upon for moral insight.
Yet it may not do to be too optimistic. A number of difficulties stand 
in the way of our converging upon common moral standards. The first 
is that it may turn out that there is only a limited area over which univer­
sal standards can legitimately range. It may be that large areas of moral 
knowledge will remain local or contextual knowledge of practices which 
are appropriate only to particular forms of human interaction. Adam 
Smith thought this, and suggested that, in the end, it was only that part 
of morality which dealt with the rules of justice that was capable of uni­
versal application.
A second obstacle to the development of universal moral standards is 
that argument and persuasion are not the only forces operating in human
57Michael Smith, "Realism," in Singer, ed., A Companion to Ethics, pp. 399-410, at p. 408.
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society. Interest is in many ways a more powerful force for social change, 
and it may be that interest will dominate over ideas in many circum­
stances, hampering moral development.
Thirdly, moral development or convergence may be held back by fail­
ures of moral insight. We may simply make mistakes in our reasoning 
when subjecting moral ideas to criticism.
Fourthly, moral development may be hindered by moral intransigence. 
People may refuse to consider alternative constructions and to subject 
their thinking to moral criticism. At worst, this may be exemplified in 
moral fanaticism, which would make moral interaction and moral devel­
opment more difficult. This point is well worth pondering at a time when 
the demise of European Communism has led many prematurely to pre­
dict the triumphant march forward of the ideals of democracy and indi­
vidual rights. On the one hand, there is no shortage of evidence that 
these ideals are held in high regard as the rulers and intelligentsia of the 
former Communist states appeal to human rights, freedom of religion, 
thought, and the press, and democracy in their daily debates and pro­
nouncements. Yet on the other hand, we see in the same regions, from 
Georgia to Bosnia, ethnic animosity and moral atrocities which have their 
roots in conflicts based on religious antagonisms and reciprocal atrocities 
committed over centuries.
Generally, there may be enormous difficulties standing in the way of 
moral convergence and the acquisition of moral knowledge stemming 
simply from weaknesses in human character. These are more serious 
obstacles to moral progress and the development of universal standards 
than mere cultural variety.
The fault, dear Brutus, lies not in our cultures,
But in ourselves, that we are underlings.
Politics, University College, University of New South Wales
